In early June the International Criminal Court appeals chamber acquitted Jean-Pierre Bemba in a 3-2 ruling. Two years ago Bemba was sentenced to 18 years’ for his role, as military commander, for atrocities committed in Central African Republic (CAR).
The decision astounded observers. The unexpected, narrowly decided acquittal, brought scads of criticism. This was because Bemba’s 2016 conviction was considered hugely significant. It assigned criminal responsibility to a senior military official physically removed from the violence. It also made sexual violence a centrepiece of the charges.
Sexual violence, a staple of war, has long been absent from international criminal law’s charge sheets. By assigning Bemba responsibility for the rapes committed by fighters under his command, the 2016 judgment was seen as an important doctrinal advance for international criminal law.
Bemba’s acquittal has wide implications. This is true both for Bemba as well as the ICC and international criminal law. Bemba, who will shortly be released, is rumoured to be returning to Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to pursue political goals. There are reports that his party, the Movement for the Liberation of Congo, known as the MLC, has nominated him as its candidate for the presidential race.
By Jina Moore
In July, 1993, an eleven-year-old named Damas Dukundane got a new pair of shoes. His mother bought them, unused, and paired them with a new blue suit. She was not terribly religious, and her son’s baptism would be the only time in her life that she would enter the brick church in the unremarkable village of Kaduha, in rural Rwanda. What the rest of the family looked like on that day, in their nicest clothes, Damas does not remember. There are no surviving photographs, and no surviving witnesses, either.
One year later, his father was missing, and his mother, like so many mothers from the area, had fled to the church, with her five children. Outside, they huddled in a crowd of hundreds, praying for their lives. The village’s men encircled them protectively, raising machetes and sticks, hoping to intimidate the interahamwe, the Hutu militias moving house to house and church to church in a national rush to exterminate the country’s ethnic-minority Tutsi population.
“At first, we were stronger than them, because we were the ones with nowhere else to go,” Damas recalled recently. “We were the ones who were fighting for our lives. Then the military came with guns, and that’s when people realized—we can never win a fight with the military.”
This is how the genocide in Rwanda unfolded. From hilltop to hilltop, across a country famous for its undulating landscape, interahamwe chased their neighbors with machetes and clubs. They were trained, dogged, and successful. But the most efficient, large-scale killing happened when soldiers arrived with automatic weapons and seemingly limitless ammunition. “When they started shooting into the crowd, the people ran. We realized this time there was no way they can fight,” Damas said. “That is how the apocalypse of us happened.”
The man who brought the military to Damas’s church was Aloys Simba. In 1994, Simba was fifty-five years old, an ex-colonel celebrated for helping to bring Juvénal Habyarimana, then the President, to power in a coup in the nineteen-seventies. On the evening of April 6, 1994, for reasons that are still a matter of historical dispute, Habyarimana’s plane was shot down. After the crash, the Tutsi became prey for legions of armed, agitated Hutu militiamen. Killings quickly began, and then spread. Virtually every hilltop became a death site that rainy season, as Hutu extremists killed an estimated eight hundred thousand of their neighbors in just a hundred days.
Simba armed the soldiers who attacked the Kaduha parish. He ordered them to chase every last Tutsi who might escape and kill any Hutu comrade who showed mercy. He forced the condemned to dig their own graves. In 2005, Simba was convicted of genocide and crimes against humanity at an international war-crimes tribunal, in Arusha, Tanzania. Other places where he killed—Murambi, Kibeho—are, in today’s Rwanda, touchstones of collective memory. His conviction was affirmed in 2007, after an appeal.
Soon, if all goes as planned—and there is little reason to expect that it will not—Simba, a giant of genocide, will be a free man. He is expected to be paroled, along with Dominique Ntawukulilyayo, who, after promising twenty-five thousand Tutsis safety, lured them to a hilltop in Kabuye before having them slaughtered, and Hassan Ngeze, a journalist whose hateful propagandist newspaper, Kangura, many Rwandans still see as the real fuel of the genocide. The court regards Ngeze’s conviction for inciting genocide as a “landmark” in international justice, though his life sentence was reduced to thirty-five years on appeal.
“We really thought someone like Ngeze, at least, who really incited the extremists to kill their neighbors, should stay in prison for life,” Freddy Mutanguha, the vice-president of Ibuka, a national association of survivors of the 1994 genocide, said. “He made too many victims in this country. It’s really very insulting.” He called the court’s practice of early release “a new form of impunity.”
Whether to release the three men is up to one judge, Theodor Meron, the president of the Mechanism for the International Criminal Tribunals, whose decision cannot be appealed. Though thousands of procedural considerations went into setting up the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, twin courts tasked with trying the perpetrators of near-simultaneous genocides, the ad-hoc system nevertheless failed to establish clear standards for sentence reductions. Now, more than twenty years after the trials began, the guilty who have been imprisoned in seventeen countries around the world are asking to get out early. A study from 2014 found that nearly half of the convicts from both courts have been released, the vast majority of them before serving full sentences.
The first decisions in paroling genocidaires cited domestic parole regulations, which often grant eligibility after two-thirds of a sentence has been served; over time, as Meron has noted, the Tribunals have come to rely on two-thirds of time served as an eligibility standard. But critics question any parole system for the world’s gravest crimes. Early release of rehabilitated criminals may make sense in states that are trying to reduce the costs of incarceration, and where authorities can monitor the activities of parolees. But the criminals convicted by international tribunals have perpetrated a scale and degree of harm that domestic regulations were not designed to account for; furthermore, they are not supervised after their release, and there are no legal grounds for detaining them should they once again begin stoking ethnic hatred or worse. In a letter to the court, the Rwandan government has adamantly protested the request, writing that the men’s crimes “offend all standards of humanity, morality and decency” and continue to harm Rwanda and Rwandans a quarter-century later. Damas wholeheartedly agrees. “This may not be something the whole world is ready to understand—it’s just my opinion—but, if we are going for justice, Simba cannot be let out,” he told me. “It would be unfair for the small people who took those machetes, who came running after us, who had no idea of whatever was happening up the chain of command.”
More than a million of those “small people,” the petty genocidaires, were tried over nearly a decade in Rwanda’s gacaca, or “grass courts,” a system meant to insure that not a single Hutu crime went unpunished. Early releases came after both confession and contrition, which the accused often demonstrated by showing the community where he had left the bodies of those he killed. At gacaca, remorse, like innocence, required proof.
The system is different for those convicted in the U.N.-created Tribunals. In granting early release to the convicted, the Tribunals presume their rehabilitation—even when they demonstrate precisely the opposite. So far, we know very little about the remorse of the three men asking now for early release: a confidentiality rule protects the contents of their applications. Johnston Busingye, Rwanda’s Minister of Justice, said that the government twice asked to see the applications prior to its response, but the court never replied. “This is not a deal with thought for the victims,” he said. “This is a deal between the convicts and the court.”
In fact, Busingye said, this is the first time since the early release of Rwandan genocidaires began in 2012 that the court has bothered to ask for the Rwandan government’s input at all. The court is not required to consult with Rwandan officials before ruling on early-release applications, nor is it required to inform any of the eighteen hundred people who were offered witness-protection services in exchange for their testimony. In 2016, when Ferdinand Nahimana, who co-founded a hate radio station that broadcast the names and locations of surviving Tutsis, was released after serving two decades of his thirty-year sentence, the Rwandan government and its citizens, including those who testified against him, found out on the radio.
When the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda concluded its last trials, in 2012, its sixty-two convictions were hailed as a triumph of justice, both in the narrow criminal sense and, more broadly, as a method of historical documentation and a foundation for reconciliation. So far, nearly twenty per cent of its convicts have been released early. If the three pending requests succeed, the lawyers for the Rwandan government expect Théoneste Bagosora, who is regarded as the mastermind of the genocide, to file a similar request later this year.
Human-rights advocates say that paroling the perpetrators threatens the entire logic of international criminal law. “You convict people for genocide, they get relatively low sentences, and then they are eligible for early release—it completely undermines the process,” Toby Cadman, a co-founder of Guernica 37, an international-justice law firm in London, told me.
Or, as Damas put it: “If Simba is let out, who is left in?”
More than hate, more than fear, more than machetes or machine guns, scale has always been the genocidaires’ most powerful weapon. The world remembers mass murder, mass rape, mass crimes, and speaks with pathos of nameless, faceless victims—and the tribunals tell us, through millions of pages of testimony and other overwhelming proof, that those mass crimes were committed by these relatively few men. The perpetrators’ ability to execute atrocity outstrips our capacity to imagine it. We cannot grasp it. The overwhelming proof overwhelms us. A countable collection of perpetrators has become as faceless, as abstract, as the thousands and thousands of people they’ve killed.
This is not, of course, how Damas feels about Aloys Simba. Damas, whom I first met in Rwanda nearly fifteen years ago, is now the father of three children, and an adopted member of my family. But, after the soldiers sent by Simba shot into the crowd at Kaduha parish, he never saw his own family again: his mother ran, with a newborn in her arms and Damas’s siblings trailing behind, down a hill. Damas, at eleven, had refused to follow. He fled up the hill instead, and he was pushed by a stranger into the priests’ living quarters. He hid under a bed there, as the massacre that began at dawn dragged into dusk. “There was screaming, screaming—there were so many people to kill—and more screaming, until it was the last voice,” he said. “And then that was that.”
This, Damas has learned, is the injustice of international justice: the killers, like their victims, become nameless, faceless statistics. And if we cannot name them, and we cannot imagine their crimes, we will hardly notice when they are let go.
Published on The New Yorker on July 9, 2018
Mr. Karim Asad Ahmad Khan Appointed Special Adviser and Head of the Investigative Team to support domestic efforts to hold ISIL (Da’esh) accountable
United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres today announced the appointment of Mr. Karim Asad Ahmad Khan of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as the Special Adviser and Head of the Investigative Team, which was established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2379 (2017), to support domestic efforts to hold ISIL (Da’esh) accountable by collecting, preserving, and storing evidence in Iraq of acts that may amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide committed by the terrorist group ISIL (Da’esh) in Iraq.
Mr. Khan is the first Head of the Investigative Team. He is a barrister and Queen’s Counsel in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, with more than 25 years of professional experience as an international criminal law and human rights lawyer. Mr. Khan has extensive experience in acting as prosecutor, victim’s counsel and defence lawyer in domestic and international criminal tribunals, including, but not limited to, the International Criminal Court, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
Mr. Khan holds an LLB (Hons) in law from King’s College, University of London, and various other degrees and qualifications. Mr. Khan has studied and lectured on Islamic law and has published extensively in the area of international criminal justice and human rights.
Published on the UN News Center on May 31, 2018
The prosecutor of the international criminal court has asked it to rule on whether it has jurisdiction over the deportations of Rohingya people from Myanmar to Bangladesh, a possible crime against humanity.
A ruling affirming jurisdiction could pave the way for an investigation into the deportation of many thousands of Rohingya, though Myanmar is unlikely to cooperate.
In a filing published on Monday, the court prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, listed the well-documented mistreatment of Rohingya and cited the UN special envoy for human rights who described it as bearing the “hallmarks of genocide”.
She argued that although Myanmar was not a member of the court, the fact that part of the alleged crime took place on the territory of Bangladesh, which is a member, meant the court could seek powers of jurisdiction.
“The prosecution seeks ... to verify that the court has territorial jurisdiction when persons are deported from the territory of a state which is not a party to the statute directly into the territory of a state which is a party to the Statute,” the filing says.
“This is not an abstract question but a concrete one, affecting whether the court may exercise jurisdiction ... to investigate and, if necessary, prosecute.”
Bensouda argued that, given the cross-border nature of the crime of deportation, a ruling in favour of ICC jurisdiction would be in line with established legal principles.
But she acknowledged uncertainty around the definition of the crime of deportation and limits of the court’s jurisdiction.
Her request is the first of its kind filed at the court. She asked the court to call a hearing so that her arguments could be considered, as well as those of other interested parties.
The magistrate assigned to consider the request, Congolese judge Antoine Kesia-Mbe Mindua, will have considerable leeway in determining how to proceed.
According to the United Nations, some 700,000 mostly Muslim Rohingya fled their homes into Bangladesh after militant attacks in August last year triggered a military crackdown that the United Nations has said constitutes ethnic cleansing.
Myanmar, which has a majority Buddhist population and government, rejects that charge, saying its forces have been waging a legitimate campaign against Rohingya who attacked government forces. Many in Myanmar regard the Rohingya as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh.
Published on The Guardian on April 10, 2018
By FELIPE VILLAMOR
The International Criminal Court said on Thursday that it was opening a preliminary investigation into accusations that President Rodrigo Duterte and other Philippine officials had committed crimes against humanity in the course of the government’s deadly crackdown on drugs.
Fatou Bensouda, a prosecutor for the international court, said in a statement that the inquiry would gauge whether there was enough evidence to build a case. She said she would be looking at events since July 1, 2016, “in the context of the ‘war on drugs’ campaign.”
“My office undertakes this work with full independence and impartiality,” Ms. Bensouda said. “As we do, we hope to count on the full engagement of the relevant national authorities in the Philippines.”
Harry Roque, a spokesman for the Philippine president, said that the government’s crackdown was a “legitimate police operation” and that the president welcomed The Hague-based tribunal’s decision.
“He is sick and tired of being accused of the commission of crimes against humanity,” Mr. Roque told reporters in Manila.
In a 77-page complaint filed to the tribunal in April, a Filipino lawyer accused Mr. Duterte and 11 other officials of mass murder and crimes against humanity. He called Mr. Duterte the “mastermind” of a campaign of extrajudicial killings that dated to the late 1980s, when he became mayor of the southern city of Davao, and that greatly escalated after he became president.
The lawyer, Jude Josue Sabio, represented two men who said they had been assassins for Mr. Duterte in Davao.
“I am elated and vindicated,” Mr. Sabio said, adding that he was “confident we will hurdle this first big step, and hopefully a warrant of arrest will be issued by the I.C.C. against Duterte and his cohorts.”
Mr. Duterte, who has bragged about personally killing criminals as mayor of Davao, won the presidency promising to fill Manila Bay with the bodies of drug addicts. After taking office, he urged the police to kill drug suspects and promised to protect officers from prosecution. Thousands of Filipinos have been killed by the police, in what the authorities said were shootouts, or by unidentified gunmen.
Last year, after an outcry over the killings of three teenagers by police officers, Mr. Duterte suspended the police operations and put the antidrug campaign in the hands of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency. But he put the police back in charge in December. Last week, the police said that 46 people suspected of using or selling drugs had been killed by the policesince then.
That brought the police’s official death toll from the campaign to over 4,000, a number much lower than the estimated 12,000 deaths reported by various international and local rights groups.
Senator Antonio Trillanes, a prominent political foe of Mr. Duterte, said the news of a preliminary inquiry “should jolt Duterte into realizing that he is not above the law. More important, this is the first step for the victims’ families quest for justice.”
Mr. Roque, the presidential spokesman, played down the significance of the inquiry, saying that the tribunal prosecutor was “merely exercising his mandate to determine whether there is reasonable basis to proceed.”
The tribunal can take cases only if a country’s own judicial system is unable or unwilling to pursue them, a condition that Mr. Roque said did not apply to the Philippines. “We view, of course, this decision of the prosecutor as a waste of the court’s time and resources,” he said.
Published on The New York Times on February 8, 2018
On 15 December 2017, Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued a decision setting the amount of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo's liability for collective reparations at USD 10,000,000. The decision completes the Order for Reparations of 3 March 2015 in the case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, which awarded collective reparations to the victims of the war crimes committed by Mr Lubanga, namely: conscripting and enlisting children under the age of 15 into an armed group (Union des patriotes congolais/Forces patriotiques pour la libération du Congo) and using them to participate actively in hostilities.
The Chamber examined a sample of 473 applications representative of all of the victims potentially eligible for reparations and concluded that 425 of them were most likely direct or indirect victims of the crimes of which Mr Lubanga was convicted. The Chamber stated, however, that further evidence established the existence of hundreds or even thousands of additional victims affected by Mr Lubanga's crimes. The Chamber also stated in this respect that some potential victims were no longer willing or able to take part in the reparations process for safety reasons.
The Chamber recalled that the scope of a convicted person's liability is proportionate to the harm caused and, among other things, his or her participation in the commission of the crimes for which he or she has been found guilty, in the specific circumstances of the case. The Chamber further recalled that only collective reparations were awarded in this case. The Chamber assessed the harm suffered by the aforementioned 425 persons recognized as victims of Mr Lubanga at USD 3,400,000, and equitably assessed Mr Lubanga's liability exclusive of the harm suffered by those persons at USD 6,600,000 – bringing the total amount of Mr Lubanga's liability for collective reparations to USD 10,000,000.
In view of Mr Lubanga's indigence, the Chamber invited the Board of Directors of the Trust Fund for Victims to examine the possibility of earmarking an additional amount for the implementation of collective reparations in this case and/or continuing its efforts to raise additional funds. The Chamber also instructed the Trust Fund to make contact with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to explore how the Government might contribute to the reparations process.
On 21 October 2016, the Chamber had approved the implementation of symbolic collective reparations and, on 6 April 2017, it had approved the first stage of the implementation of service-based collective reparations, directing the Trust Fund to begin the selection of implementing partners (after which the Chamber may approve the second stage of the implementation process). The Chamber will decide in due course on the next steps in the implementation of collective reparations.
The members of the Trial Chamber II Bench are Judge Marc Perrin de Brichambaut (Presiding Judge), Judge Olga Herrera Carbuccia and Judge Péter Kovács. The Chamber issued its decision publicly in a hearing at the seat of the ICC in The Hague, Netherlands. The Legal Representatives of both groups of victims, the Office of Public Counsel for Victims, the Defence and the Trust Fund were in attendance.
Published on the ICC on December 15, 2017
After more than 24 years of operations, the United Nations tribunal set up to prosecute crimes committed during conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990s, has now completed all judicial work, the court’s President told the UN Security Council on Wednesday.
“Despite all the sceptics, the naysayers, the deniers who, from the very beginning, embarked on a campaign against the Tribunal and have been at pains to question our legitimacy and integrity and portray a doomsday scenario, I am proud to appear before this esteemed Council today and say: mission accomplished,” declared Carmel Agius, President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), in his final briefing to the 15-member body.
Recalling the Security Council’s decision to create the Tribunal back in May 1993, Mr. Agius stated: “In retrospect […] the establishment of the ICTY was one of the international community’s proudest moments.”
Noting that the body had developed a completion strategy and delivered judgements in the final trial case against Ratko Mladic on 22 November and the final appeal case against Jadranko Prlic et al. on 29 November, Mr. Agius said that in supporting the creation of the court, his predecessors had put their signature on an important page in the history of international justice and the fight against impunity.
There was another history, however, he said, namely of those who were afraid to accept the Tribunal and even denounced it, “of those who did not choose to fight impunity, but, for reasons of political or personal gain, blind nationalism and ethnic hatred,” preferred immunity and even glorified those who had committed atrocities.
The Tribunal’s achievements did not begin and end in The Hague, where the body is headquartered, Mr. Agius continued. He was disturbed by the numerous crimes yet to be prosecuted before domestic courts in the Former Yugoslavia. The rise of revisionism and nationalism throughout the region could not be ignored.
“Do not delude yourselves; the absence of war does not mean peace,” he said. Ending impunity for mass crimes is not the preserve of any one institution – it is a common goal that ties all together in the shared quest for justice, peace and stability.
In closing, President Agius stated: “As the international community now looks on while mass crimes continue to take place, even as I speak, and geopolitical roadblocks impede any kind of comprehensive justice solutions, we must not forget the political courage that sparked the ICTY’s existence, the Tribunal’s long trajectory, and the need to stay the course.”
Beyond the Tribunal’s success, reconciliation remains a significant challengeTheodor Meron, President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, affirmed that the Tribunal had made plain that even complex trials could and must be conducted in accordance with the panoply of due process guarantees. As a result, the principles of international law were stronger and, “accountability for grave crimes is increasingly the expectation rather than the exception.”
Describing the current activities of the Residual Mechanism, which will maintain the Tribunal’s legacy and carry out its remaining functions, he said it is “serving as a new, effective and efficient model of international court” in carrying out duties such as preparations for administration disposition of records, in further developing its legal and regulatory framework and working on provision of assistance to national jurisdictions.
The fulfilment of the Mechanism’s mandate depends on the ongoing support of the Council and the broader international community and on the commitment to all concerned to the invaluable legacies of the tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.
In his remarks, the Prosecutor of the International Residual Mechanisms for Criminal Tribunals, Serge Brammertz, said his Office remains focused on expeditiously completing the limited number of trials and appeals transferred from the ICTY and on locating and arresting the remaining eight fugitives indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).
He acknowledged that the Tribunal failed to achieve reconciliation in the Former Yugoslavia, where many still viewed convicted war criminals as heroes while victims and survivors were ignored and dismissed. “The reality is that there is still no true will within the region to accept the immense wrongdoings of the past and move forward – sadly, most of all among the political leadership,” he said.
Too many people listen to war criminals, who hide behind claims of collective responsibility, when in fact no community bore responsibility for what those men had done. He emphasized that justice is an essential precondition for achieving reconciliation.
Published on UN News Centre on December 6, 2017
By Eric Oteng
Two Africans have been elected as judges of the International Criminal Court in the Hague, the Netherlands during the Assembly of State Parties meeting in New York on Wednesday.
The election procedure required a two/thirds majority of eighty votes for one to be elected as a judge of the International Court which adjudicates on cases of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity..
After four rounds of voting, Justice Reine Alapini-Gansou from Benin and Justice Solomy Bossa of Uganda got elected with a total of eighty three (83) and eighty one (81) votes respectively.
Ghana’s Henrietta Mensa-Bonsu failed in her bid to join the court as she ended with a total of sixty votes which fell short of the votes required.
Elected judge of the ICC, Reine Alapini Gansou is a Lawyer to the Bar of Benin since 1986 and Law lecturer at the University of Abomey-Calavi (Benin) since 2000.
Justice Alapini Gansou is the Chairperson of the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights since 2009.
She has been a member of the Commission since 2005 and was formerly the Special Rapporteur on Rights of Human Rights Defenders in Africa (2005-2009).
She served as a member of the UN Permanent Court of Arbitration since July 19, 2011, and Laureate of the Prize of Human Rights for the Fiftieth year of African Countries independence in 2010.
Her good works saw her selected as a member of the United Nations International Commission of Inquiry on post-electoral violence in Cote d’Ivoire (May-June 2011)
She holds two High Level University degrees, in Common Law at the University of Lyon in 2007 and in Environmental Law and Politic at the University of Lome, Maastricht and Bhutan in 1999.
She is also an author and co-author of research papers in Human rights and Law.
Justice Solomy Balungi Bossa on the other hand is a national of the Republic of Uganda who was elected Judge of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights in June 2014, for a term of six years.
She has served as Judge with the High Court or Uganda for sixteen years (1997-2013).
She also served the East African Court of Justice for five years (2001-2006), the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (UNICTR) for nine and half years (2003-2013) and currently serves as Judge on the Court of Appeal/Constitutional Court for Uganda.
She was once a Lecturer/Law Reporter at the Law Development Centre of Uganda for seventeen years (1981-1997).
She is a member of the International Commission of Jurists, the international Association of Women Judges, the African Centre for Democracy and Human Rights and the East African Judges and Magistrate’s Association, among others.
At national level, she is a member of International Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA) Uganda Chapter, the National Association of Women Judges, and the Uganda Association of Judges and Magistrates.
She also participated through the aegis of the International Commission for Jurists, in the initial stages of drafting of the Additional Protocol on Women to the African Charter.
She holds a Bachelor of Law Degree (LL.B) Honors from Makerere University.
She is a candidate for a Master of Law Degree (LL.M) from the University of London.
She has received various national, regional and inter-national awards in recognition of her distinguished services as a legal practitioner, judge and human rights activist.
The two African justices join four others from Japan, Canada, Peru and Italy to fill six slots available.
Published on Africa News on December 7, 2017
THE PROSECUTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, FATOU BENSOUDA, REQUESTS JUDICIAL AUTHORISATION TO COMMENCE AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE SITUATION IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN.
The Situation in Afghanistan has been under preliminary examination by the Office of the Prosecutor since 2006. After a comprehensive and careful scrutiny of the information available to the Office, applying the applicable Rome Statute legal criteria, the Prosecutor has determined that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation of the Situation in Afghanistan.
As required by the Statute, the Prosecutor has, therefore, requested authorisation from Pre-Trial Chamber III, for an investigation into alleged crimes committed on the territory of Afghanistan in the period from 1 May 2003, as well as other alleged crimes linked to the armed conflict in Afghanistan and committed on the territory of other States Parties to the Statute, since 1 July 2002. The Court does not have jurisdiction over alleged crimes committed in the context of the Situation in Afghanistan before these cut-off dates.
As a result of its examination, the Office of the Prosecutor has determined that there is a reasonable basis to believe that the following categories of crimes within the Court's jurisdiction have occurred:
The Office has carefully assessed available information on any relevant, genuine national proceedings in relation to the conduct of these identified groups. In light of the gravity of the acts committed - the details of which are outlined in the Request - and the absence of relevant national proceedings against those who appear to be most responsible for the most serious crimes within this Situation, the Prosecutor considers that the potential cases that she has identified and that would arise from an investigation in this Situation, would be admissible pursuant to article 53(1)(b) of the Statute.
Furthermore, the Office has determined that there are no substantial reasons to believe that the opening of an investigation would not serve the interests of justice, taking into account the gravity of the crimes and the interests of victims.
Today, as per the applicable rules, the Prosecutor also notified victims or their legal representatives, of her intention to request authorisation to initiate an investigation in the Situation in Afghanistan informing them that they have until 31 January 2018 to submit representations to the Judges of Pre-Trial Chamber III on her Request.
If the Pre-Trial Chamber authorises the Prosecutor to begin an investigation, as mandated by the Rome Statute, the Office's sole objective will be to independently, impartially and objectively investigate and prosecute alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity, committed in the context of the conflict in Afghanistan.
Based on the evidence collected by the Office during the course of an investigation, if authorised, the Prosecutor can request ICC Judges to issue either summons to appear or arrest warrants, against those, as a rule, believed to be most responsible, no matter who the perpetrator, for alleged atrocity crimes committed in connection with the Situation in Afghanistan.
Published on the ICC on November 20, 2017.